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THE METHOD OF AMENDING THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION.*
The Supreme Court of the United States has said, that
the Federal Constitution, "speaks not only in the same
words, but with the same meaning and intent with which it
spoke when it came from the hands of its framers." This
statement is so obviously sound that it seems strange that
anyone should suggest that the meaning of a written instrument changes, or that it may be held to mean one thing at
one time and something else at another. Nevertheless, there
is a spirit abroad in our land which apparently seeks to
justify a construction of the Constitution not warranted by
its words, and which would read that instrument in the
light of the changing conditions of the tinies, without regard to the real intention of its founders.
Those who are actuated by this spirit must presume
that the framers of the Constitution and the people who
adopted it did not understand the force of language. They
differ flatly from Chief Justice Marshall, who in Gibbons
v. Ogden, said: "The enlightened patriots who framed our
* An address delivered by the Hon. William P. Potter, Justice of
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, at the annual meeting of the
Alumni of the Law Department of the University of Pennsylvania, on
April 23, i9o9, and printed with his kind permission. -
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Constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense
and to have intended what they said." This is the only safe
and reasonable rule to follow, and it seems almost incred-

ible that any departure therefrom should have been suggested.
Evidently the conviction that some amendments were
necessary, and knowledge of the difficulty of securing them
has led to this strange attitude towards the Constitution.
The feeling was perhaps most fully voiced in one of the
addresses at the meeting of the American Bar Association
in 1907, in which the speaker, referring to the contention
of the loyal supporters of the Constitution, that if it is to
be changed it must be done in the manner which the instrument itself provides for its amendment, remarked: "To
say that, however, is to say that it shall not be changed at
all, for we are taught by a century of our history that the
Constitution can no longer be thus amended."
This was putting it very strongly. But, at any rate, it
emphasizes the necessity of looking into the method of
amending the Constitution with a view to learning whether
or not the American people have actually tied themselves
(]own by a provision altogether too rigid for practical purposes. If it be so, I do not believe that it is beyond the
power of the American people to cure the defect. Certainly the advantages of a written Constitution are too
great to be lightly surrendered. And so long as we have
it, as Justice Story said, "Every word in the Constitution
is to be expounded in its plain, obvious, and common-sense
meaning, unless the context furnishes some ground to control, qualify or enlarge it."

If the thought or wish of the

people has changed in any important respect, then let the
letter of the organic law be changed in the regular way,
so as to give plain expression to that purpose, without resort to the dangerous method of conjecture, in order to
restrict or extend it.
If, then, I ask your attention to a consideration of the
method of amending the Federal Constitution, it is not
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because of any shadow of a thought that any part of that
great document has become obsolete, or that in its essential
principles it is not a sufficient safeguard for the liberties of
the people under present-day conditions. On the contrary,
I believe that if any restatement of its doctrines is required,
it should be in reaffirmance of the cardinal principles upon
which it stands; and in particular reaffirmance of that great
principle, which was an innovation in the history of government, the feature by which the people retained in their own
hands the management of their own local affairs, and yet

combined in such a way as to present to the outside world
a united front as a nation. As Professor Stimson truly
says, it was a "wonderful scheme whereby local self-government, the control by the people of their own affairs,
which was, from prehistoric times, a cardinal Anglo-Saxon
right, was recognized and conjoined with the powerful
National Government, working directly upon the people and
not upon the states, as had been the case in all other federations of history, and was the case even in our own Continental Congress. So that we, the people, manage our own
domestic affairs, sue and are sued in our own courts, are
tried under our local laws, while yet we have clothed the
National Government at Washington with power adequate
to defend the nation, maintain its dignity abroad, and duly
regulate affairs of national concern."
We inherited that great original principle of the English
judicial system-the right of the people to trial in local
courts properly constituted in accordance with the common law and not in distant tribunals. This right is clearly
recognized in the Federal Constitution, in the seventh
amendment, which provides for the preservation of trial
by jury in suits at common law, and prohibits any fact so
tried from being re-examined in any court of the United
States, otherwise than in accordance with the rules of the
common law. The right of the people in the various parts
of our country to administer their local affairs, without
.interference from any outside s'ource, is. a fundamental
principle from which we, as a liberty loving nation must
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never depart. John Fiske said, in his lectures on "The
Critical Period of American History," "If the day should
ever arrive (which God forbid) when the people of the different parts of our country shall allow their local affairs
to be administered by prefects sent from \Vashington, and
when the self-government of the States shall have been so
far lost as that of the departments of France, or even so
far as that of the counties of England-on that day, the
progressive political career of the American people will
have come to an end, and the hopes that have been built
upon it for the future happiness and prosperity of mankind
will be wrecked forever." I believe, however, that any
such danger is remote; and that any tendency which, if
allowed to continue unchecked would interfere with their
right of self-government, needs only to be fairly brought
to the serious attention of the American people to insure
its condenation and repudiation.
When I ask you to consider whether, in view of these
pronounced tendencies to which I have referred, it is not time
for the American people seriously to consider the adoption
of a simpler and easier process of altering or amending the
Constitution, it is not with a view to *providing for any
specific change, but only for the purpose of giving, upon
any question that may arise, an opportunity for prompt and
effective utterance to the real and substantial wish of the
American people, the ultimate source of political power
with us.
In a government controlled and limited by a written
Constitution as is ours, the test of actual sovereignty is
to be found in the power to amend the Constitution. When
you ascertain where, and how, and by whom that power is
exercised, you have located the source of sovereignty. It
is in the people, acting at the call of two-thirds of the
States, or of Congress. But you will remember that the
ratification of an amendment is not by three-fourths of the
people in mass; it is only by the voice of the people taken
in groups-by states. And, therefore, it follows that with
us the political sovereignty lies not with the people of the

MIETHOD OF AMENDING FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

593

Republic as a whole, but with the majority of the people

in three-fourths of the States. It is that body which adopts
and gives force and expression to the supreme law of the
land.
To obtain an expression of the will of the people in a
constitutional way is admittedly a very difficult and tedious
thing. It cannot be denied that the process is so difficult
that it discourages any attempt to bring about any change
or alteration in the way which the Constitution itself dIesignates. Thoughtful students of the times have not failed
to note that this difficulty has brought about on the part
of those who desire an enlargement of the powers of government, what seems to be an undue tendency to strain the
Constitution in the direction of their desires to an unwarrantable extent. A well-grounded fear has been felt and
expressed, that the difficulty of amendment is considered a
sufficient excuse for seeking, through executive action and
forced construction, the exercise of powers not clearly bestowed by the Constitution. Any such effort, in however
good a cause, and however well meant it may be, must be
repugnant to every loyal and intelligent supporter of the
Constitution. Its tendency must eveutuilly be to weaken
respect for the written expression of the organic law of
the nation. It has been said that "reverence for the Constitution is the choicest political virtue of a free people."
If this be true, we cannot with safety consent to any lowering of our standard in this respect. President Washington
foresaw the temptation and the tendency, and you will recall the solemn words in which he adjured the people to
make no change in the Constitution, except in the regular
and authorized way. Ie said: "The basis of our political
system is the right of the people to make and alter their
Constitution of government. But the Constitution which
at any time exists, till changed by an explicit and authentic
act of the whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon all.
The very idea of the power and right of the people to
establish a government presupposes the duty of every individual to obey the established government. * * * If,
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in the opinion of the people, the distribution or modification of the constitutional powers be in any particular
wrong, let it be corrected by an amnednent in the way
which the Constitution designates. But let there be no
change by usurpation; for though this in one instance may
be the instrument for good, it is the customary weapon by
which free governments are destroyed. The precedent
must always greatly overbalance in pernianent evil any partial or transient benefit which the use can at any time
yield."
Yet it will not do to say that the Constitution is not
capable of a certain kind of development, which may modify its working without altering its principles, and that, in
a perfectly legitimate way, through the growth of customs
and usages and by means of the processes of interpretation
and judicial construction. But these processes must always
find room to do their work within the limits pointed out
in the Constitution. They can occupy and fill up the intermediate space, and round out the territory within the walls
of the original grant, but never can they properly or legitimately be permitted to operate to change the boundaries.
"Thus far, and no farther," is the fiat of the sovereign
power. To disobey would be to place us in the same class
with countries which have no authoritative Constitution.
If the limits of power are to be extended, it must not
be by giving to the provisions of the Constitution a construction not reasonably within the meaning intended by
its framers.
Authority for any desired change must be sought from
the original source of power, the people. That such necessity will from time to time arise, is to be expected as a
matter of course. It is impossible for a vigorous people,
constantly growing and continuously developing their political institutions, to be governed by a system, and under an
instrument, rigid and tuchangeable from decade to decade and from century to century. In the very nature of
things, change there must be and change there will be, to
suit the altered conditions of the times. But it should
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come in the authorized way, and only when sanctioned by
the people.
No doubt it was with full knowledge of the previous use
of the method of developing, through interpretation, the
powers conferred by the Constitution, as well as their amplification through exccutive action, that President Roosevelt in his Harrisburg speech, some two or three years ago,
pointed out what he thought was the need of additional
powers in the Federal Government in order to carry out
plans which he deemed essential for the welfare of the
people. He frankly declared that, in his opinion, the Federal powers should be increased "through executive action
and through judicial interpretation and construction of
law." Evidently with the same thought in mind, Secretary
Root shortly afterwards, in a speech in New York City,
declared that if the people desired it, "sooner or later constructions of the Constitution will be found to vest more
power in the National Government."
It is proper to assume that upon neither of these occasions was it intended to announce any startling or revolutionary doctrine. The idea, evidently, was that additional
power in the desired direction might properly be obtained
in one of the ways by which enlargements of the meaning
and scope of the powers conferred by the Constitution have
heretofore often been made. But it is just here, we have
great reason to believe, that the danger lies. It is in the
acceptance and perpetuation of the feeling that the regular
method of amendment of the Constitution is so difficult as
to be hopeless; and, therefore, to serve a good purpose, resort to the grasp of additional powers may be justified by
means of a forced construction of the Constitution, and by
executive action thereunder. This theory, if carried to its
logical end, can only result in undermining and destroying
the deliberate, emphatic expression of the permanent Will of
the people, as set forth in the Constitution. It would destroy
all the advantage of a written Coistitution, the puipose of
which is, as Doctor Judson has said, "security against buses
on the part of those intrusted with political power, whether
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such abuses arise from design, from incompetence, or from
inadvertence. Security is found, in great part, by specific
and easily accessible knowledge as to just what are the
powers which officers of government are entitled to use,
and particularly as to the powers forbidden."
The law, as laid down in an American Consitution, is distinguished from other forms of law only by the formal
mode by which it may be changed. The Legislature which
places a law upon the statute book may alter or amend the
act, or may wipe it out altogether.
The court which decides a case to-day may have reason
to modify or overrule its decision later on. But a Constitution is beyond the reach of court or Legislature. It
speaks, as the voice of the people, and can be changed by
them alone in the exercise of the sovereign power.
Air. Bryce calls attention to the fact that in addition -to
the open and direct method of change by amendment, the
Constitution of the United States "has been developed by
interpretation; that is, by the unfolding of the meaning
impliedly contained in its necessarily brief terms, or by
the extension of its provisions to cases which they do not
directly contemplate, but which their general spirit must

be deemed to cover." In the words of Chief Justice Marshall, in McCullough v. .1arvland, "the Government of
the Union is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated
powers. But the question respecting the extent of the powers actually granted, is perpetually arising, and will probably continue to arise as long as our system shall exist."
He points out that a government entrusted with ample
powers must also be entrusted with ample means of executing those powers. For instance, the Constitution says that
Congress shall have power to regulate commerce among
the several States. Yet that bare permission expressed in
words so few, has been construed to atthorize legislation
regulating navigation, the construction of public works
helpful to it and to commerce, and the power to prohibit or

control immigration, and to establish a railroad commission, and virtually to control all interstate traffic; its result
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has been an immense enlargement of national control over
all the means of transportation. Again, it clearly appearing from the Constitution that Congress has been given
power to declare war, it may proceed to carry on that war
by any means that may to it seem needful and proper for
that purpose. And again, Congress having authority under
the Constitution to borrow money, it may, if it sees proper,
issue treasury notes and make them legal tender for all purposes. These are examples of the way in which the Constitution has been developed through interpretation and construction.
In the practical working of government, custom and
usage, those great and ever busy sources of law are always
at work with their moulding and modifying influences.
Perhaps the most striking and interesting instance of this
is the fact that through usage, and usage alone, the presidential electors have lost the right given to them by the
Constitution of exercising their own discretion in the
choice of president and vice-president.
It must also be acknowledged that at times those upon
whom was placed the responsibility of directing the affairs
of the Government have thought it absolutely necessary
to overstep the limits of their authority and act without
the sanction of the Constitution; but this has only occurred
under the stress of great emergencies, and to accomplish
great and essential ends; and no such action can justly be
cited as a precedent for usurping authority under any ordinary conditions.
Professor Bryce closes a chapter upon the Interpretation
of the Constitution of the United States by saying: "The
interpretation which has thus stretched the Constitution
to cover powers once undreamed of, may be deemed a
dangerous resource; but it must be remembered that even
the Constitutions which we call rigid must make their
choice between being bent and broken. The Americans
have more than once bent their Constitution in order that
they may not be forced to break it." The truth of this
comment will be apparent to everyone who attempts to
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trace the course of our national growth. What Professor
Bryce had especially in mind was the necessities of the
Civil \NVar times, when men openly said that they would
break the Constitution in order to preserve the Union. He
cites a remarkable letter of President Lincoln, written in
1864, in which he says: "My oath to preserve the Constitution imposed on me the duty of preserving by every indispensable means that government, that nation, of which the
Constitution was the organic law. * * * I felt that
measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful
by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the nation. Right or wrong, I assumed this ground and now
avow it. I could not feel that to the best of my ability I
had even tried to preserve the Constitution, if, to save
slavery or any minor matter, I should permit the wreck of
Government, country and Constitution altogether." It
was this thought, no doubt, which impelled the doing of
things which were justifiable only upon the ground that
they were war measures and necessary to preserve the life
of the nation.
Another extraordinary example of exceeding, in executive action, the limits of the Constitution in a matter of
vast commercial importance, but not involving the national
integrity or existence, was the purchase of the Louisiana
territory by President Jefferson. ie frankly acknowledged- that the necessities of the case had impelled him to
go beyond the law. While the matter was pending in Congress he said: "The Constitution has made no provision
for our holding foreign territory, still less for incorporating foreign nations into our Union. The executive, in
seizing the fugitive occurrence which so much advances
the good of the country, has done an act beyond the Constitution." But lie was not willing to stand simply upon
the ground that it was a proper case for breaking a rule
without discrediting it, or to rely upon the principle that
there are exceptions to all rules, for he was anxious that
there should be a formal approval by the people in the shape
of a constitutional amendment. He drew one up and inti-
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mated to his friends in Congress that he hoped to see it
adopted. But neither Congrcss nor the people seemed to
be sensitive upon the subject, and little interest was taken
in the matter and it was allowed to drop.
When the Constitution was adopted by the people they
said it should stand till "we, the people," by ameudnent
alter it. It is also true that since that time scores of questions have arisen which its framers could never have anticipated in any way. Political ideas, like other forms of
thought, are the result of continued growth and accumulated experience. A written or rigid Constitution, however general its terms may be, is the expression of those
ideas at a particular time; and if this safeguard is to be
preserved for the people some method of altering it so as
to keep it in touch with the times and enable it to conform
to changes in circumstances and ideas, is indispensable.
The men who sat in the Federal Constitutional Convention
of 1787 never supposed that their work was to stand for
all time as they left it, without change or alteration, and
they very naturally undertook to provide a way by whicli,
as it seemed to them, their work could with reasonable
ease be changed or amended. It is evident, also, from their
speeches in the convention and from their subsequent comments upon the subject, that they expected that the method
of amendment which they provided would be freely used.
Our own James Wilson, after pointing out that no alteration in the Constitution can be made by the Government,
because such an alteration would destroy the foundation
of its own authority, goes on to say: "As to the people,
however, in whom the sovereign power resides, the case
is widely different; from their authority the Constitution
originates; for their safety and felicity it is established; in
their hands it is as clay in the hands of the potter; they
have the right to mold, to preserve, to improve, to revise
and to finish it as they please. If so, can it be doubted that
they have the right likewise to change it? A majority of
the society is sufficient for this purpose."
Such. was Wilson's view. And no man un'derstood bet-
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ter than lie the principles upon which our form of government is founded, and he says further in this connection:
"A proper regard to the original and inherent and continued power of the society to change its Constitution will
prevent mistakes and mischiefs of very different kinds.
It will prevent giddy inconstancy; it will prevent unthinking rashness; it will prevent unmanly languor. Some have
appeared apprehensive that the introduction of this principle into our political creed would open the door for the
admission of levity and unsteadiness in all our political
establishments. The very reverse will be its effect. Let
the uninterrupted power to change be admitted and fully
understood, and the exercise of it will not be lightly or
wantonly assumed." Thomas Jeflerson, in writing to Madison from Paris in 1789, expressed the opinion that every
generation ought to make its own Constitution. He suggested that no society can make a perpetual Constitution,
or even a perpetual law. The earth belongs always to the
living generation.
Certainly the desire and intention of the framers of the
Constitution to provide appropriate and sufficient means
for its reasonable and orderly- amendment cannot be
doubted or misunderstood. Nor can the further fact be
overlooked that they very much feared any attempt to
change or alter the Constitution, except in the regular and
authorized way. They evidently would have regarded any
such attempt as flat usurpation, and they certainly did not
anticipate that the time would ever come when any real
or supposed difficulty in the process of amendment would
be made an excuse for seeking, through executive action or
strained judicial interpretation, powers not conferred by
the Constitution. Nor would they have had any sympathy with the views of those who regard the Constitution
as partaking in some degree of the expansive nature of
the common law, which continually follows the growth of
the people, and is always being adapted to their needs.
This view results from confusion of thought, and loses
sight of the fundamental distinction between the law of the
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Constitution, and the law of the Legislature and the courts.
The law of the Constitution is in all its essentials above and
beyond the reach of the Legislature or court, and speaks
with binding authority to both.
In an address by Mr. Justice Brewer, of the United
States Supreme Court, delivered a few years ago before
the Virginia Bar Association, lie sounded a clear note with
regard to the proper limitations of the courts. He said:
"We often hear the declaration that something mor6 than
a knowledge of the law is necessary for a successful judge;
that he should be endowed with the spirit of constructive
statesmanship. By this and other ways there is expressed
the thought that the new conditions of life call upon the
court to give a new and different meaning to the language
of the Constitution; a meaning larger and broader than
that which, according to the rule so clearly stated by Chief
Justice Marshall, was the meaning of the framers of the
Constitution and the founders of the Government. * * *
I know that there are changed conditions and a different
social and business life from that which obtained when
the Constitution was framed. It may be that new laws are
necessary, possibly amendments to the Constitution; but
it must always be remembered that this is a Government of
and by the people, and if additions and changes are necessary, let them be made in the appointed way. Never let
the court attempt to change laws or Constitution to meet
what they think present conditions require. When they do
this, they clearly usurp powers belonging to the Legislature and the people."
I think we will all agree that any attempt to strain the
language of the Constitution so as to make it mean anything that will suit our purpose, is both intellectually and
morally wrong. The question will naturally be asked why
it has been thought necessary to resort to indirect and circuitous methods in order to keep the Constitution abreast
of the age. If changes are needed, why was it not suggested that they be made in the regular and lawful way?
No other answer can be given than the extreme practical
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difficulty of making use of the regular and authorized
process of amendment. Yet it is very clear that this result
was never anticipated or intended by the fathers of the
Republic.
In the Federal Constitutional Convention, the first
suggestion as to the method of amendment was that the
Constitution might be changed without requiring the consent of the National Legislature. The committee of detail, in its first draft of the instrument, proposed that a
convention should be called by Congress after application
by the Legislatures of two-thirds of the States; but nothing
was said as to whether the Legislatures were to propose
amendments and the convention was to adopt, or whether
the convention was to do the whole thing-propose and
adopt; nor did the method of amendment, as proposed by
the committee of detail, enable Congress to call a convention on its own motion. Hamilton opposed this plan
because he thought it inadequate and he wished an easier
method of amendment adopted. Madison objected on account of the vagueness of the plan. The result was that
Madison brought forth as a substitute the plan which,
with some modifications, became Article 5 of the Constitution. It is as follows: "The Congress, whenever twothirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution; or, on the application of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the several States,
shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which
in either case shall be valid to all intents and purposes as

part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of
three-fourths of the several States, or by conventions in
three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congerss; provided that no
amendments which may be made prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any manner affect the
first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first
article; and that no State, without its consent, shall be
deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate."
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It will be noticed that no opportunity is afforded for tak-

ing the direct verdict of the people.
As was expected, it was not long until the process of
amendment was put to the test. For the Constitution as a
whole was probably not entirely satisfactory to any member of the convention that framed it. From beginning to
end, it was a series of compromises. But it was the best
that could be had under the circumstances. It was ratified by the requisite number of States only after long and
in some cases critical discussion; and with the practical

understanding that a number of amendments should be
promptly made. And they were. The first ten amendments'were proposed by Congress in September, 1789, so
that they were practically part of the original Constitution.
The next occasion for putting into motion the amending machinery arose out of the decision of the Supreme Court,
in Chisholm v. Georgia,holding a State liable to be sued by
a citizen of another State, and it resulted in the adoption
of the eleventh amendment, declaring that a State should
not be subject to such a suit. It was proposed by Congress
in March, 1794, and declared in force in January, 1798.
Then came the twelfth amendment, requiring the electors
to vote for president and vice-president, and virtually
recognizing the existence of political parties. This amendment was proposed in December, 18o3, and declared
adopted in September, I8O4. More than sixty years then
passed until the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, as a result of the Civil War, completed the list
as it stands at the present time.
It is well nigh forty years since the last change was
made. Yet the effort to procure amendments has been
almost continuous. Anyone interested in the subject may
find a mine of information in the .valuable monograph on
the "Proposed Amendments to the Constitution, During
the First Century of Its History," by Professor Ames, of
the University of Pennsylvania. His painstaking investigation shows that more than eighteen hundred propositions
looking to the amendment of our fundamental law were
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made during the first one hundred years of the Constitution; and aside from the fifteen which were adopted, only
four of these propositions succeeded in getting through
both Houses of Congress. The reason for the failure of
so great a number of attempts, Professor Ames says, is,
"in part because sonie were suggested as cures for temporary evils, others were trivial or impracticable, still others found a place in that unwritten Constitution which has
grown up side by side with the written document; but the
real reason for the failure of those other amendments
which have been called for repeatedly by the general public has been due to the insurmountable constitutional obstacles in their way."
Certainly, the expectation of the Fathers of the Republic,
that the method of amendment which they provided would
be satisfactory, has not been fulfilled. The process suggested in the instrument itself has proven to be too difficult and complicated in practical application to be fairly
workable. This became apparent long ago; for in the last
.case in which Chief Justice Marshall discussed a constitutional question, Barron v. Baltimore, of January Term,
1833, lie referred to the machinery for procuring an
amendment to the Constitution as being "unwieldy and
cumbrous."
Time and growth of the country, and a vast increase in
population have added to the difficulty. When the Constitution was adopted, three-fourths of the States meant
nine; now it means thirty-four. Then an amendment
meant an appeal to a comparatively compact population,
largely of Anglo-Saxon descent, with an inherent geniug
for self-government and imbued strongly with the ideas
of liberty, and tenacious of the rights of the individual
under the common law. Now the adoption of an amendment means reaching and convincing the leaders of a vast
population, scattered over an immense area, many of them
having behind them no heritage of free constitutional government. The success of a proposed amendment calls for
united action by so many groups of people; the process is
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so slow and so complex, and so liable to be interfered
with while under way, that it comes very near the impossible, except where there is the most intense conviction upon
the part of a majority of the people. With the rapid
increase of population and the consequent increase in the
membership of Congress and in the nunber of States, the
difficulty of using effectively the authorized process of
amendment has greatly increased until, as President Woodrow Wilson has well put it, "No impulse short of the impulse of self-preservation, no force less than the force of
revolution, can nowadays be expected to move the cumbrous machinery of Article 5."
Yet, to change or alter the Constitution in any other way
means usurpation and disloyalty to the supreme law of
the land, to which we have all sworn allegiance. What,
then, is to be done? Obviously, but one thing-amend the
article of the Constitution which governs the process of
amendment.
The provision, however, that no State shall without its
consent be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate,
must stand. Under the existing fundamental law, that
clause cannot be touched, without the consent of every
State in the Union, and to that extent it must remain as
a prohibition upon the power of amendment. But except
as to that particular feature, sound reason and enlightened
political science unite to justify the adoption of a new
method of amendment. Why should it be thought necessary, in order to accomplish some good purpose, to strain
the Constitution or go beyond the plainly expressed intention of its framers? Why should we even be willing to
remain in doubt as to what those intentions really were?
It is not as though the oracle which spoke when the law
was given had become a dumb, unresponsive thing. Not
at all. We have with us at all times the living oracles. We
need only to consult the will of the people to ascertain
whether any fundamental change is desired. It is not
as though the revelation of the people's will had been given
but once, for all time, and we were, therefore, bound by
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painful exegesis and exacting analysis to ascertain at our
peril the meaning of every word and phrase used.
The Constitution ought not to be regarded as though it
were the last will and testament of the only body capable
of making a plan of government for the American people.
Yet we seem to have treated it in just that way. We
have apparently lost sight of the fact that the nation is
in full and vigorous existence, virile, growing and expanding from decade to decade, and just as capable of knowing
its own mind as to what it desires as ever it was, and just
as capable of giving expression to those desires.
How, then, shall the immobility of the Federal Constitution be remedied? How shall the amendment article be
amended so as to carry out the real purpose and intent of
its framers? The question may be answered in the most
natural way, by availing ourselves of our own experience
in a field in which the Americai people have not allowed
themselves to be hampered in the expression of their fundamental political ideas, and where their genius for selfgovernment has been dev,:'oped to the best advantage; that
is, in the adoption and amendment of the Constitutions of
the various States of the Union; for it is to that quarter
that the student of constitutional law must turn if he
wishes to know what the American system really is. Doctor Borgeaud, a keen student of the provisions of written
Constitutions, says that European critics of American
democracy almost always make the mistake of looking
only at the Federal Constitution of the United States, and
of leaving unexamined the Constitutions of the several
States. Professor Bryce also has shown that the institutions of the States are the real foundation of the national
institutions. He says: "It has been truly said that nearly
every provision of the Federal Constitution that has
worked well is one borrowed from or suggested by some
State Constitution; nearly every provision that has worked
badly is one which the convention, for want of a precedent,
was obliged to devise for itself."
If we find, then, that the method by which the greater
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part of the State Constitutions may be amended has worked
well, it is reasonable to suppose that substantially the same
plan will give satisfaction to the same people, when grouped
together in the consideration of national affairs. It was
in Connecticut, in 1818, that the method of amendment
seems to have originated, which has since become the predominant system throughout the Union, so that it may well
be called the American system. Its essential requirement
is that the genuine voice of the people shall be heard,
speaking not through representatives in convention, but at
the polls, in direct affirmance or rejection, of the propositions submitted for adoption as part of the fundamental
law.
The Hartford Convention provided that a majority of
the Legislature of the State might propose alterations and
amendments to the Constitution, which proposals should
then be continued to the next General Assembly; and if
then approved by two-thirds of each House, the amendment was to be submitted to the electors of the State, and
if approved by the majority of them, the amendment was
to be valid as part of the Constitution. Substantially the
same article was soon after incorporated into the Constitution of Maine. That State, however, did not retain the
test of two Legislatures as to the initiative, but was satisfied with the adoption of a proposal by a single Legislature,
by a two-thirds majority of each House, to authorize the
submission of an amendment to the people. Then in 1820,
Massachusetts, on the proposal of Daniel Webster, fell
into line and adopted substantially the same article, substituting, however, a simple majority in the place of a twothirds majority, in the action by the Senate. The next
year, in 1821, the State of New York recognized the principle of ratification of the Constitution directly by the
people. Virginia followed; then came South Carolina and
North Carolina; and in 1836 the principle was included
in the Constitution prepared for the State of Michigan,
prior to its admission to the Union.
And then, in 1838, came our own Pennsylvania Consti-
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tutional Convention, which in its plan for amending the
Constitution provided for the submission to the people of
a proposition, when passed by a simple majority of two
successive Legislatures, and to become a part of the Constitution when ratified by a majority of the qualified voters
of the State. And that provision, as you know, was retained practically unchanged in the present Constitution.
The principle has amply vindicated itself throughout the
Union, and it is safe to say that the making or amending
of a Constitution would not now be considered complete
unless it included the sanction of the people at the polls in
the final enactment or rejection of the proposition submitted.
The details of the process vary somewhat in the different
States. According to the latest information I have
been able to get, seventeen of them require the vote of
two-thirds of one Legislature to initiate, and a majority
of the people voting, to enact or adopt. Ten States, of
which Pennsylvania is one, require the vote of a majority
of two Legislatures and a majority of the people voting.
Seven of the States require the vote of three-fifths of one
Legislature, and a majority of the people voting. In four
States, the vote of a majority of one Legislature is required before submission to the people. Two States, Connecticut and Tennessee, require the vote of a majority of
one Legislature, and a two-thirds vote of the next succeeding Legislature, before submission to the people. In
so far as my examination has gone, South Carolina is the
only State which requires a two-thirds vote of two Legislatures and a majority of the people. In Rhode Island a vote
of three-fifths of the people is required, after a majority of
two succeeding Legislatures has passed upon the proposed
amendment. Massachusetts requires the vote of a majority of the Senate, and of two-thirds of the House of
two succeeding Legislatures, and a majority of the people.
While Vennont's requirement is the vote of two-thirds of
the Senate and a majority of the House, of one Legislature,.
and a majority of both Houses of the next Legislature,
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before submitting the proposition to the people. New
Hampshire votes every seven years upon the question of
whether a convention to revise the Constitution shall be
called, and if one is called, any proposed alterations must
be approved by two-thirds of the qualified voters. But
her Legislature has no voice whatever in the process. Delaware goes to the opposite extreme and allows the Legislature to do all the work of amendment, and the people
have no direct voice in the matter. Possibly, some of the
States have in late years made changes that I have not
been able to note or examine. But in most of the States,
I think it is safe to say, that a simple majority of those
voting is sufficient, when it comes to the final enactment
of an amendment.
Merely by way of suggestion, I would say that, applied
in its simplest form to the amendment of the Federal Constitution, this method, which is so general that it may fairly
be called the American system, would perhaps mean the
proposal .of an amendment in eitherI House of Congress,
agreement thereto by a majority cf each House, then its
submission to the people and ratification by a majority of
the qualified voters in a majority of the States.
A method of amendment, involving substantially these
features, would open the way for the practical application
of the principle affirmed by that profound constitutional
lawyer, Daniel Webster, when in the Massachusetts Convention of 1820 he said: "I know of no principle that can
prevent a majority, even a bare majority of the people,
from altering the Constitution."
No careful student of the methods of the American people will feel that there is any reason to fear hasty action
when it comes to changing the organic law. Taken as a
whole, the conservative instinct of our people is very great.
Even when the need for action is clear, the inertia of the
mass is very difficult to overcome.
Certainly, the authorized method of amending the Federal Constitution should permit the people to signify and
enact with reasonable ease, as part of the fundamental law,
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any permanent change in the form of their political
thought. And in doing this, I can conceive of no safer
way than to follow the general system which has been
well tested by, and has given wide satisfaction to, the same
American people, in performing the same office in the
various States of the Union.
But whatever the method of amendment may be, I am
sure we will all agree that loyalty to the Constitution, the
supreme law of the land, demands that every lawyer, at
least, shall stand fast in support of its plainly expressed provisions until they are altered in the legitimate and authorized way set forth in the instrument itself.
Every student of American history must realize that the
Republic has had in the past the benefit of the best thought
of its best men. It is entitled to the same service to-day,
and it needs that service as much as ever it did. It5 lawyers, its professional men of every type, its business men,
should know no higher duty or greater privilege than the
service of our common country, in helping to solve the
problems of self-government. Such service ought not to
be regarded as a sacrifice; but if so, then should it be,
indeed, a willing sacrifice.

